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ARGUMENT 
I. MANY OF WIFE'S ARGUMENTS ADDRESSING WHETHER THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DISMISSAL WAS PROPER UNDER RULE 12(b) OF THE UTAH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE MISUNDERSTANDS THE PRIMARY 
ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT AS ONE DEALING WITH SUFFICIENCY OF 
PLEADINGS 
Pursuant to an Order of this Court, dated November 25, 2008, Husband's Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari was granted as to the following issue: 
"Whether the majority of the panel of the court of appeals erred in its 
assessment of the availability of civil claims for unjust enrichment and 
breach of contract in the context of the motion to dismiss filed in this case." 
See Court's file. The Petition for Writ of Certiorari argued these alternative civil claims 
should not be permitted outside of the parties' divorce action where there was no formal 
written agreement or distinction of relationship between the parties other than husband 
and wife. 
It was argued by Husband in the court below that the trial court's motion to 
dismiss was proper both as a matter of pleadings and procedure as well as because the 
causes of action raised by Wife were improper outside of a divorce proceeding. 
However, it is Husband's understanding that based on his Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
the only issue before this Court is whether such civil claims are available to Wife given 
the facts of the case. 
Hence, Husband's argument at this level of review does not spill much, if any, ink 
over the nuances of the Statute of Frauds, elements of a contract claim, partial 
performance, etc. The main thrust of Husband's contention is that the trial court's 
dismissal of Wife's Complaint was proper because damages should not be awarded when 
1 
the facts asserted arise entirely from a marital relationship without a formal agreement or 
separate, distinguishing relationship between the parties. 
II. WIFE'S "BREACH OF CONTRACT" AND "UNJUST ENRICHMENT" 
CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED 
There are nearly always inequities and broken promises upon the failure of a 
marriage. The question presented in this case requires that this Court decide whether an 
agreement between spouses primarily intended to determine who would ultimately be the 
primary breadwinner and primary homemaker should be reduced to the same type of 
analysis used in commercial and business relationships. In other words, are breach of 
contract and unjust enrichment available to a spouse as alternative causes of action 
outside the divorce proceeding, and if so, under what circumstances? It is Husband's 
contention that under the facts of this case, Wife should not be permitted to seek different 
forms of relief through a separate civil proceeding. 
A, The facts of this case do not justify granting Wife an opportunity to seek 
alternative civil relief outside of divorce proceedings 
The essence of Wife's argument is that she and Husband agreed that she would 
work while he completed his medical degree and that upon employment, Wife would be 
the primary homemaker and (presumably) enjoy a standard of living that accompanies a 
doctor's income. See Brief of Respondent, Statement of Facts, p.5-8. Wife has never 
alleged or stated that this agreement was formalized into a written product. Rather, Wife 
refers to this agreement as having been developed from certain "communications." See 
id. at p. 6, paragraph 6. 
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Wife wrongly implies that she paid for Husband's education. See id. at p. 12. 
This is not true as Husband's tuition and partial living expenses, from which Wife also 
benefitted, were financed through student loans which Husband is solely responsible for. 
It is important to clarify that Husband here has not been "unjustly enriched" with a free or 
partially paid for education at the expense of Wife. Thus, Wife is left with the claim that 
due to her observance of marital duties (offering love, companionship, and support) she 
should be awarded damages based on Husband's earning potential which is necessarily 
tied to his medical degree. This is virtually indistinguishable from a claim that she holds 
a property right to Husband's degree. 
It is ironic that Wife seeks civil damages based on the parties' agreement that she 
support Husband by working and tending to their household affairs while he attended 
school, and then criticizes Husband for suggesting that under her own analysis the true 
economic benefit she conferred consisted of providing income, domestic assistance, and 
other services. See id. at p. 34. Perhaps just as ironic is that using Wife's arguments and 
characterization of the parties' "agreement," Husband likely has a cause of action against 
Wife for breach of contract inasmuch as she was the party who left the marriage and filed 
for divorce. Husband's ideas are not a "throwback" to the 1950s, but rather a prospective 
analysis that will surely follow if spouses are enabled to file alternative civil cases. In 
fact, Husband's argument is a protection for both the parties and the courts from a 
multiplicity of claims in the twenty-first century. Indeed, should a husband be allowed to 
sue a wife because she did not fulfill her promises of supporting him in school, becoming 
a primary homemaker, having children, or a commitment to work to support the family 
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during the marriage? Indeed, the general complaint of "broken promises" that are a part 
of all divorce actions, would be elevated to contract or commercial status with the 
attendant law suit remedies for nearly all divorce cases. 
Wife, by filing two separate cases, has also attempted to avail herself "two bites" 
of the proverbial apple representing alimony in the divorce action and damages in the 
civil action. Other litigants will certainly follow suit as a method to either be doubly-
rewarded or to hedge their bets and receive compensation from at least one proceeding. 
B. U.C.A. § 30-3-5 specifically addresses and provides for the relief sought by 
Wife, thus precluding the need or propriety of alternative civil remedies. 
The Utah Legislature has enacted laws which deal with awarding spousal support 
upon divorce. In fact, U.C.A. § 30-3-5(8)(a)(vii) states that a court shall consider 
"whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spousefs 
skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse 
to attend school during the marriage." Thus, the law has already provided the specific 
analysis for compensating a spouse in Wife's position upon failure of a marriage. 
To go outside the confines of domestic law without a formal contract (such as a 
pre or post-marital agreement) or a distinguishable relationship between the parties other 
than being "spouses," takes away from the full meaning and effect of this law. Wife 
propounds concepts of "justice" and receiving the "benefit of her bargain" in order to 
persuade that alimony would be insufficient. In doing so she implies that a spouse, by 
virtue of being married and having performed otherwise typical marital duties and 
obligations, has full right to any future earning capacity of the other spouse. This type of 
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rationale strays far from the opinions of Utah appellate courts and statutes governing 
divorce. 
Another benefit of keeping compensatory awards within the context of a divorce 
action is that the payor spouse has the protection of the theories and policies underlying 
alimony. For example, alimony should not be employed to punish nor reward a spouse. 
However, Wife is clearly able to do both by seeking an award of damages in this 
alternative civil action. Moreover, because alimony is modifiable upon a showing of a 
"substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce," 
see U.C.A. § 30-3-5(g), the award is flexible enough to allow for a reduction in support if 
the payor is, for example, disabled and not capable of performing the same tasks and 
earning the same income. However, if Wife is granted a judgment for damages, no such 
flexibility is present to the detriment of Husband, perhaps before he ever achieves the 
earning potential so vehemently asserted by Wife. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner, Dallen Ben Ashby, respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the Court of Appeal's ruling and hold that the civil claims raised by 
Respondent are unavailable when arising out of the context of a marital relationship, 
notwithstanding that relief may still be obtained through the parties' divorce action. 
Respectfully Submitted, March 30, 2009, 
David J. Hunter 
Counsel for Defendant/Petitioner Dallen Ben Ashby 
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